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Abstract
This paper explores how to optimally set taxes and transfers when taxation authorities:
(1) are uninformed about individuals’ value of time in both market and non-market activi-
ties and (2) can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. We
show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment
upwards for low wage individuals through decreasing wage-contingent employment subsidies,
and distorting employment downwards for high wage individuals through positive and in-
creasing marginal income tax rates. In particular, we show that whether a person is taxed
or subsidized depends primarily on his wage, with the optimal program involving a cut-off
wage whereby workers above the cutoff are taxed as they increase their income, while workers
earning a wage below the cutoff receive an income supplement as they increase their income.
Finally, we show that the optimal program transfers zero income to individuals who choose
not to work.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, H21, H23.
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1 Introduction
In most countries income redistribution is achieved through a variety of programs: these
include direct income taxation, employment programs, welfare, unemployment insurance
and pension schemes. Viewed as a whole, these programs create intricate incentives and
complex redistribution patterns. Since the conditionality of these programs is quite varied,
they generally result in a net tax-transfer system that depends not only on income but often
depends on the extent of market participation as well. Reasoned economic policy should
attempt to identify whether or not these programs are mutually consistent with the goal of
redistribution.
The object of this paper is to explore the principles that should guide the evaluation of
tax- transfer systems that depend on both market income and on quantity of time worked.
In order to illustrate the types of issues we want to address, we start with an example
of an individual who pays taxes or receives transfers from a government depending on his
interaction with three different systems: an income tax system, a social assistance system
(welfare) and an unemployment insurance system.1 The example is inspired by the Canadian
social system, however it has been purposely simplified to clarify issues and therefore the
numerical values should be viewed as mainly illustrative.
Let y represent an individual’s market income, let h represent the number of weeks (≤ 50)
worked by an individual over a year and let T represent total taxes (net of transfers) paid
by the individual over a year.
The income tax system:
If y ≤ $6000, there is no income tax; on income above $6000, a marginal income tax of
20% is applied (i.e., income tax equals max [.2(y-6000),0]).
The social assistance system (welfare):
If y ≤ $6000, the social assistance payment is $6000− y; if y > $6000, there is no social
assistance payment.
The unemployment insurance system:
Letting h be the number of weeks worked, if h ≤ 10, the individual is not eligible for
unemployment insurance; if 10 < h ≤ 30, then the individual is eligible for h− 10 weeks of
unemployment insurance payments at 60% of weekly wages, up to a maximum payment of
$400 per week; if 30 < h < 50, the individual is eligible for 50 − h weeks of unemployment
insurance payments at 60% of weekly wages, up to a maximum payment of $400 per week.
Consider the net tax implication of these three systems combined. The net amount
of taxes paid (or transfer received) depends both on an individual’s wage rate and on the
number of weeks worked. Hence the pattern of tax rates faced by individuals varies with
different market wage rates. In particular, consider the case where individual 1 earns $600
per week worked, and individual 2 earns $1000 per week. Then the net taxes-transfers, T ,
paid by individuals 1 and 2 as a function of annual income are given below. In calculating
1For simplicity, we have not included in the example the interaction with the pension system. However,
the issues we address are also potentially relevant for pension systems since these programs have pay-outs
that depend both on income earned and on amount worked.
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these tax rates, we assume that an individual receives unemployment insurance payments
for any eligible non-working weeks:2
Tax function of individual 1:
If y ≤ 6000, T = y − 6000 (marginal rate of 100%);
If 6000 < y ≤ 18000, T = −.4(y − 6000) (marginal rate of -40%);
If 18000 < y, T = −4800 + .8(y − 18000) (marginal rate of 80%);
Tax function of individual 2:
If y ≤ 6000, T = y − 6000 (marginal rate of 100%);
If 6000 < y ≤ 10000, T = .2(y − 6000) (marginal rate of 20%);
If 10000 < y ≤ 30000, T = 800− .2(y − 10000) (marginal rate of -20%);
If 30000 < y, T = −3200 + .6(y − 30000) (marginal rate of 60%).
There are three aspects to notice about this tax-transfer system. First, the tax rate
depends not only on income but also depends on a worker’s revealed market type, that is
his wage rate. In particular, note that marginal tax rates are different at different income
levels depending on a worker’s wage rate. Second, the individuals face high marginal tax
rates at both high and low income levels. Third, the individuals face negative marginal
tax rates for intermediate income segments. Let us emphasize that all these features stand
in stark contrast to the prescriptions one would derive from a Mirrlees’ type optimal tax
problem. However, given that the above example allows tax rates to be wage dependent, we
immediately know that Mirrlees’ analysis does not directly apply and hence an alternative
framework is needed.
In this paper, we examine an optimal income tax problem in hope of providing guidance
on how to design such a system. For example, we would like to know how to best set a tax
and transfer system when the government can design the system to depend both on income
and wage rates (or the number of weeks worked). Moreover, since we believe that one of
the concerns of governments is to avoid transferring substantial income to individuals that
simply do not want to engage in market employment, our analysis recognizes that individuals
may have different valuations for their non-market time.
Our approach to the problem follows the optimal non-linear income taxation literature
2In this Canadian inspired example, we treat the unemployment insurance system as a transfer system
that depends on whether an individual is employed or unemployed, and we treat the employment decision as
under the worker’s control. Obviously, this depiction departs from the aim of the Canadian Unemployment
Insurance system which is directed at supporting involuntarily unemployed individuals. However, in practice,
it is widely recognized, in both the press and by politicians, that a large fraction of unemployment insurance
payments in Canada have traditionally been paid out to individuals that are more akin to voluntarily
unemployed individuals than to involuntarily unemployed individuals. For example, there are many examples
of individuals who have taken up employment for a duration that exactly corresponds to the minimum
duration needed to obtain unemployment benefits, then, once they attain the duration needed to obtain
benefits, they return to unemployment until benefits run out and then they start the cycle anew. For such
individuals, the unemployment insurance system plays the role of a work contingent transfer scheme precisely
as we have modelled it in the example. Part of the impetus for this paper derives from this observation, but
instead of dismissing such transfers out of hand as undesirable since they did not reflect the original goal
of the unemployment insurance system, our aim is to devise a framework in which we can discuss whether
such employment contingent transfers may be desirable when viewed as part of a social transfer system.
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as pioneered by Mirrlees (1971),3 that is, we approach redistribution as a welfare maxi-
mization problem constrained by informational asymmetries. However, we depart in two
directions from Mirrlees’ formulation. The first concerns the perceived need to target more
effectively income transfers. For example, traditional welfare programs (or minimum rev-
enue guarantees) are often criticized on the grounds that they transfer substantial income
to individuals who value highly their non-market time, as opposed to transferring income
only to the most needy. Although such a preoccupation is common, the literature is mostly
mute on how to address this issue since the standard framework assumes that individuals
value their non-market time identically. The second issue relates to the possibility of using
work time requirements as a means of targeting transfers. Many social programs – such as
most unemployment insurance programs or pension programs – employ information on time
worked (either in years, weeks or hours) in order to determine eligibility; therefore it seems
reasonable to allow for such a possibility when considering how best to redistribute income.
Hence, the environment we examine includes (1) taxation authorities which are uninformed
about individuals’ potential value of time in market activities and about their potential
value of time in non-market activities,4 and (2) income transfers that can be contingent on
both earned (market) income and on the allocation of time to market employment and, as
a result, also on the wage rate. Under the above assumptions, our redistribution problem
formally becomes a multidimensional screening problem with two dimensions of unobserved
characteristics.5
Given the two-dimensional informational asymmetry, it is not surprising that the proper-
ties of the optimal redistribution program derived under our informational and observability
assumptions are quite distinct from those found in the standard setup. More specifically, we
show that optimal redistribution in our environment entails
• A cutoff wage, where individuals with wage above the cutoff are taxed and individuals
with wage below the cutoff are subsidized.
• For individuals below the cutoff wage, their employment level is distorted upwards as they
face wage-contingent income subsidies that decrease as income increases.
• For individuals above the cutoff wage, their employment level is distorted downwards as
they face positive and increasing marginal tax rates as they increase their income.
• Individuals that choose not to work receive no income transfer.
The above results provide a stark contrast with those of the standard non-linear taxa-
tion literature in large measure because in that literature the informational asymmetry is
restricted to the value of market time. Since his seminal contribution, Mirrlees’ analysis
has been extended in several directions. Many of the extensions of Mirrlees’ original anal-
ysis involve giving more tools to the taxation authorities. For example, see Guesnerie and
3See also Mirrlees (1997).
4In our formulation, non-market activities can be interpreted as non-declared market activities.
5Screening problems with two-dimensions of unobserved characteristics are becoming more common in
the literature. See Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chone´ (1998) for the state of the art in this literature and
a discussion of some of the difficulties associated with solving such problems.
3
Roberts (1987) or Marceau and Boadway (1994).6 In a different vein, Boone and Bovenberg
(2004) extend the Mirrlees’ model by introducing search costs and frictions. The model
generates voluntarily unemployed individuals, involuntarily unemployed individuals and em-
ployed ones with heterogeneous levels of productivity. Search gives rise to bunching at the
low end of the productivity distribution. One surprising aspect of much of the traditional
optimal taxation literature is that it conflicts with current policy debates which, de facto,
tend to favor active employment programs such as employment subsidies (negative marginal
taxation). More recent works by Balestrino, Cigno, and Pettini (2003), Saez (2002), Chone´
& Laroque (2005) and Laroque (2005)7 show that negative marginal tax rates can be optimal
when one focuses on the extensive margin, that is, when labor supply is a zero-one decision.
Moffitt (2006) examines the case where the government cares directly about the level of work
of the poor, as opposed to having a welfarist objective. In this environment, Moffitt shows
that negative marginal tax rates can be optimal. The current paper adds to the literature
by highlighting why negative marginal tax rates can be optimal in a welfarist environment
where individuals can adjust on both the intensive and the extensive margin. In particular,
our approach prescribes a negative marginal tax rate on the margin where individuals choose
their hours of work; an individual with a sufficiently low wage experiences an increase in net
income in response to an increase in his hours worked that is greater than the associated
increase in market income. This we believe captures the margin that is at the core of many
policy discussions about negative marginal tax rates.8 In Chone´ and Laroque (2005) and
Laroque (2005), negative marginal tax rates arise when an increase in the wage – holding
hours fixed – leads to a decrease in taxes. However, for an individual, the wage is not a
choice variable, so individuals cannot try to improve their situation by taking advantage of
the negative marginal rate.9
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the constrained redistribution
problem and discuss the laissez-faire and the first-best allocation. In Section 3 we discuss the
case where individuals’ market productivities are known but their non-market productivities
6See also Besley and Coate (1995), Brett (1998), Cuff (2000), and Kanbur, Keen and Tuomola (1994).
7See also Diamond (1980) who first addressed the extensive margin in a Mirrlees’ type model.
8The model of Balestrino, Cigno, and Pettini provides two dimensions of unknown ability, market and non-
market. For some parameter values—positive skill correlation and assuming that the laissez-faire marginal
utility of the low skilled is greater than that of the high skilled—they find results similar to ours, taxing high
incomes and subsidizing low ones. There are however only two types and many of their results depend upon
the curvature of the social welfare function and its interaction with the curvature of the utility function. The
environment analyzed by Saez is substantially different from the one considered here and therefore a direct
comparison is difficult. In particular, Saez (2004) examines an environment with costly job choice and moral
hazard with respect to which jobs to choose. The framework does not allow agents to vary their market
time, nor does it allow for differences across agents in the value of their market time, two aspects which are
central to our work.
9Concurrently with this paper, Chone´ & Laroque (2006) have specified a model which can study both the
intensive margin and the extensive margin as limiting cases. As our analysis considers intensive and extensive
margins, our work is closely related to this paper. There are nevertheless several differences between the two
papers. For example, when discussing the intensive margin Chone´ & Laroque (2006) have effectively only
one dimension of heterogeneity and do not consider the intensive and extensive margins in the same model
as we do here.
4
are not. In Section 4 we analyze the case where both the valuations of market and non-
market time are unknown. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss how the optimal solution can be
implemented by a simple social policy that depends on wage rates and market income, as
was the case in our initial example. All proofs, with the exception of some in Section 4, are
relegated to the appendix.
2 The Environment
Consider an economy that has two sectors—a formal market sector and an informal, non-
market or household sector. Income earned in the formal sector can be observed and hence
taxed. The amount of time allocated to the formal sector is also assumed to be observable.
Since the wage rate earned in the formal sector can be deduced from market income and time
spent working in the market, the wage rate earned can be treated as effectively observable.
However, the individuals’ intrinsic market productivity, that is the highest possible wage
they can earn, is assumed unobservable. Besides working in the formal sector, an individual
can also allocate time to production in the informal/household sector. Production in this
sector is unobservable.10 Each agent is endowed with a fixed number of hours which we
have normalized to one; if an individual works for h ≥ 0 hours in the formal sector, he has
1− h hours available for producing goods in the informal sector. Individuals have identical
utility functions that are known and which depend upon the consumption of goods from
both sectors of the economy. Individuals differ in their abilities and the ability level can vary
across sectors. For example, one may be very productive in the formal/market sector but
have low productivity in the informal sector or conversely.
Before describing this problem further, it is worth discussing the assumption about the
observability of time worked, which could represent hours, weeks or years. This is particularly
relevant since the more common assumption in the literature is that hours worked are not
observable11 and that only income is observable. In practice hours or weeks worked are used
in many countries to determine eligibility for social programs. For example, in Canada, one
of the biggest social programs is unemployment insurance. Eligibility and payments from
the Canadian unemployment insurance system depend explicitly on income and the amount
of time worked (both in terms of weeks and hours per week). This is a clear example of a
large program that exploits information on time worked to determine transfers. Problems
with measuring time worked do not appear to be very important.12 Another example of
10Production in the household sector can be viewed as income that the government cannot see. This
could reflect revenues from illegal activities or activities that allow tax avoidance, such as activities that are
remunerated through non-taxed barter.
11Dasgupta and Hammond (1980) and Maderner and Rochet (1995) also examine optimal redistribution in
environments where taxation authorities can transfer income based on market-income and market allocation
of time. However, in these papers there is only one dimension of unobserved characteristics. See also
Kesselman (1973) and Bloomquist (1981) for a related literature.
12There are obviously some groups in society for which it is very difficult to measure the amount of time
worked, for example the self-employed. Accordingly, these groups are often excluded from programs such
as unemployment insurance. Moreover, if transfers are made contingent on time worked, this may create an
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work contingent transfers is the UK Working Tax Credit (WTC). This program requires a
minimum number of hours of work per week to be eligible for a transfer, and the requirement
varies with family situation. Finally, there are many social experiments that use or have
used work time requirement as a condition for income transfer. Grogger and Karoly (2006)
review results from several of these experiments; see also Moffitt (2004) for a discussion of
how work requirements affect behavior. In Canada there is a large scale experiment aimed at
encouraging welfare recipients to work; this program is called the self-sufficiency project (see
Card and Robins (1996) for details). One particular aspect of this program is that it explicitly
requires individuals to work 30 hours per week in order to be eligible for a transfer; recipients
are required to mail in pay stubs showing their hours of work and earnings for the month.
Again, this illustrates that social programs currently use information on time-worked and
therefore it seems relevant to allow for such a possibility in our analysis. Obviously, working
time is not observable for everyone. Nonetheless, we believe that it is useful to examine the
case where we assume it is observable, and later we discuss how our results would need to
be modified if time worked is not observable for high wage individuals.
Let types be indexed by i, j ∈ I × J, where I = {1, . . . , n} and J = {1, . . . ,m}. i ∈ I is
the productivity of an individual with type i in the formal/market sector and j ∈ J is the
productivity of an individual with type j in the informal/household sector.13 pij denotes the
joint probability that an agent’s productivities take values i and j, respectively. For the time
being we impose no restrictions on the probability distribution of i and j. Assumptions are
introduced below when needed. To ease notation, we shall assume that m ≥ n, which implies
that in each group of individuals with the same market productivity there is a type who is
equally productive in both market and non-market activities, so j = i for that individual.14
Individuals evaluate their well being according to the utility function
U (h · w + (1− h) · j − T ) (1)
where w ≤ i is the wage rate earned in the market sector and T is the amount of taxes
paid to or subsidies received, respectively, from the government. We assume that U (·) is
increasing, differentiable, and concave. Note that the argument of the utility function is the
net-income of the individual thus assuming that the individual consumes two goods that are
perfect substitutes. The first good is bought from net market income; ci = h · w − T is the
amount consumed of this good. In addition, the individual consumes cj = (1− h) · j units
of the good he produces in the informal sector.
incentive for firms and workers to collude to exploit the redistribution system. Although this is a possibility
that should be kept in mind, we abstract from it in the current analysis since it does not appear to be a
widespread concern in the actual implementation of programs which do depend on work time information.
13Normalizing the type space in this way is appealing because it allows to extend our results to the
continuous case by simply replacing sums by integrals.
14This is not crucial; it just avoids a case distinction. For the case where m < n, one has to define an
object f (i) , which is the largest j for individuals with market productivity i such that j ≤ i.If m ≥ n then
f (i) ≡ i; if m < n, then f (i) < i for some i.
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The government’s objective is to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function.15 But the
government is unable to implement a first-best optimum due to the asymmetry of informa-
tion. In particular, the government cannot observe skill levels of individuals in either sector,
that is, the government cannot observe either i or j. By the revelation principle, we can
restrict attention to direct, incentive-compatible mechanisms, where individuals are asked to
announce a type (ˆı, ˆ) and the government chooses an allocation of work-time between the
sectors, hıˆˆ, a tax to be paid by the individual, Tıˆˆ, and a job allocation, wıˆˆ, such that the
individual is presumably able to do this job, that is wıˆˆ ≤ ıˆ. It is immediate that the job
allocation decision is trivial. At any solution to the government’s problem, every individual
must work in his most productive job. Otherwise a Pareto improvement can be created. We
prove this statement in section 4. For wıˆˆ = ıˆ, the government’s problem can be written as
follows
max
{hij ,Tij} i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
{∑
i
∑
j
pij · U (j + hij · (i− j)− Tij)
}
s.t., for all (i, j) : (2)
U(j + hij · (i− j)− Tij) ≥ U(j + hıˆˆ · (ˆı− ˆ)− Tıˆˆ) ∀ˆ,∀ıˆ ≤ i, (3)
U(j + hij · (i− j)− Tij) ≥ U(j), (4)∑
i
∑
j
pij · Tij = 0, and 0 ≤ hij ≤ 1. (5)
In the above problem, (3) represents the incentive compatibility constraints, (4) represents
the participation constraints and constraint (5) represents the materials balance constraint.
Since the incentive compatibility constraints in this problem are not standard, some clarifi-
cation is in order. An individual can costlessly mimic any other individual who has a lower
market productivity; that is, individual (i, j) can choose to be employed in any job paying a
wage w ≤ i. In effect, the incentive compatibility constraint (3) ensures that individual (i, j)
finds his allocation at least as good as that of any agent employed at a wage no greater than
his own market productivity i. The participation constraints, (4), reflect our assumption
that the government cannot impose a positive tax on an individual with no market income,
that is, the fruits of non-market activity are not transferable to the government. Under this
assumption, any individual can guarantee a minimum level of utility by simply not working.
This is a problem of multi-dimensional screening, and thus potentially complex to solve.
However, the incentive compatibility constraints (3) reveal a crucial difference to the general
problem of multi-dimensional screening. To clarify this difference we have rewritten the
individual’s income as the sum of the value of his time out of the market, j, and the gain from
market participation, which we define as the after-tax excess income hıˆˆ · (ˆı− j)− Tıˆˆ. Note
that both (3) and (4) depend effectively only on the after-tax excess income16. Moreover,
15Most of the results of this paper can be derived under the more general assumption that the government
maximizes a quasi-concave Paretian welfare function, as opposed to being a strict utilitarian.
16To see this formally, apply the monotonic transformation U−1 (the inverse of U) to both sides of (3)
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the after-tax excess income depends only on the message sent about market productivity, ıˆ,
but not on the market productivity itself. The dependence on the market productivity is
only implicit in the sense that to each ıˆ there is an upper bound which is equal to i. These
elements of the problem contribute to making it tractable.
To help understand the constraints imposed by the informational asymmetries, we begin
by characterizing the laissez-faire and the first-best outcomes when both i and j are assumed
to be observable.
2.1 Laissez Faire and First Best
In a laissez-faire world all types whose market productivity is greater than or equal to their
non-market productivity, i ≥ j, work full time, hij = 1, and all types whose non-market
productivity exceeds their respective market productivity, i < j, do not work, hij = 0.
This allocation of labour across the formal and informal markets is efficient. The individual
utilities at this allocation are given by U(max{i, j}) and utility levels range from a high of
U(m) to a low of U(1). The social planner’s objective is to reduce this range by means of
taxes and subsidies.
In the first-best situation, the government is assumed to know the productivities of each
individual both in the market and in non-market employment. The problem is to find the
optimal redistribution of income among individuals under the constraint that the redistri-
bution is feasible and that individuals are willing to participate. Formally, the government’s
problem can be stated as
max
{Tij ,hij} i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
{
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pij · U (j + hij · (i− j)− Tij)
}
s.t.
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pij · Tij = 0,
hij · (i− j)− Tij ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ hij ≤ 1 for all i, j.
The problem is strictly concave in the choice variables. The optimal allocation of working
times is
h∗ij =
{
1 if i ≥ j
0 otherwise.
The first-order condition for T ∗ij is
U ′
(
j + h∗ij · (i− j)− T ∗ij
)− λ ≤ 0; h∗ij · (i− j)− T ∗ij ≥ 0
(
U ′
(
j + h∗ij · (i− j)− T ∗ij
)− λ) · (h∗ij · (i− j)− T ∗ij) = 0
and (4) and subtract j from both sides.
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where λ is the multiplier on the budget constraint. Thus, either the participation con-
straint is strictly binding and h∗ij · (i− j) − T ∗ij = 0, or the participation constraint is not
binding, h∗ij · (i− j) − T ∗ij > 0, and the individual’s marginal utility is set equal to the
marginal utility of everyone who receives a strictly positive net excess income. Hence, utility
for these individuals must be equalized, that is j+h∗ij · (i− j)−T ∗ij = c for all (i, j) such that
h∗ij · (i− j)− T ∗ij > 0. It follows that the after-tax excess incomes at the optimum, equal to
c−j, depend only on the non-market productivity j but not on market productivity i. An in-
dividual therefore receives a strictly positive after-tax excess income of c−j= h∗ij ·(i− j)−T ∗ij
if j < c and the individual receives a zero after-tax excess income if j ≥ c.
Using these definitions and the optimal allocation of working time we can restate the
government’s budget constraint as
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pij ·max {c− j, 0} =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pij ·max {i− j, 0}
which determines the optimal level of c∗.
We illustrate in Figure 1 the properties of these two allocations where, for ease of expo-
sition, we depict the case in which there are just two distinct levels of market productivity
i′′ > i′. In the laissez-faire world, there are three types of income heterogeneity. Individuals
Figure 1: The laissez-faire and the first-best allocations are depicted for individuals with
market productivity i′ (left panel) and i′′ (right panel). The dots are total income((ih+(1−
h)j) in the case of laissez faire, and the squares are total income (ih + (1 − h)j − T ) for
the case of the first best. The triangles are hours worked in market activities for the case of
laissez-faire and the circles are hours worked in market activities in the first-best.
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with a value of non-market time j ≤ i′ work in both market productivity groups, but those
with market productivity i′′ have a higher total income. Individuals with i′ < j ≤ i′′ work
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only if their market productivity is i′′ but not if it is i′. So for these individuals income
heterogeneity is determined by the difference i′′ − j. Finally, types with j > i′′ do not work,
and their incomes are higher than the incomes of types that are active in the formal sector.
The first-best allocation eliminates income heterogeneity between all individuals (i′, j)
and (i′′, j) for all j ≤ i′′. Individuals with a high market productivity and a value of non-
market time below c∗ all pay the same tax Ti′′j = i′′ − c∗; those with a high market pro-
ductivity and c∗ < j ≤ i′′ pay taxes that just make them indifferent between engaging in
market activities and informal activities, Ti′′j = i
′′ − j. Likewise, individuals with a low
market productivity and a value of non-market time below c∗ all receive the same subsidy
that elevates their incomes to the level c∗, Ti′j = − (c∗ − i′) . Individuals with i′ < j ≤ c∗
receive a type dependent subsidy, that is the lower the larger is their value of non-market
time, Ti′j = − (c∗ − j). Finally, individuals with value of non-market time higher than i′′
do not pay taxes nor do they receive subsidies. Notice that the participation constraints
constrain the set of feasible redistribution schemes since individuals can always choose to
engage in non-taxable non-market activities. This is key to understanding our problem.
Obviously, the first-best allocation creates incentive problems. If an individual faces the
above transfer scheme, and could lie about his type, he would want to claim that he has a
low value of non-market time, and an even lower value of market time. In Figure 1 he would
claim to be type (i′, i′ + 1) . This way the individual would receive the biggest transfer and
enjoy the fruits of his non-market activity. It is also of interest to examine which incentive
constraints would bind if an individual could only lie about his non-market type j. In this
case, an individual with high market productivity i′′ (which is above c∗) would claim to
have value of non-market time j = i′′, so as to pay no taxes. That is, these individuals
would claim to be type (i′′, i′′) . Individuals with low market productivity i′ (which is below
c∗) would want to claim to have the lowest possible value of j subject to j > i′. That is
they claim they are of type (i′, i′ + 1) , which implies that they can enjoy the fruits of their
non-market activity and receive the largest possible transfer. What is important to notice
in this case is that the direction in which the incentive constraints bind depends upon an
individual’s market type. Individuals with a high market productivity who are taxed have
incentives to exaggerate their value of non-market time. Overstating one’s non-market type
implies that the outside option is more tempting and hence that the individual is willing
to pay only a smaller amount of taxes in exchange for the right to participate in market
activities. Individuals with a low market productivity who are subsidized have incentives to
understate their value of non-market time. For an individual who spends some time outside
of the market this amounts to understating total income, which implies that the individual
should receive a larger transfer. The property that the direction into which an individual is
tempted to deviate depends on the level of market productivity contributes to making the
solution to this screening problem non-standard.
3 Observable Market Characteristics
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Let us begin with the case where market characteristics are observable, while the value of
non-market time is not. In this case, it is helpful to further break down the problem into
a few steps by treating individuals with the same market productivity as a group. For any
such group, we first examine how best to proceed if we want to extract a total revenue of T
from the group, and then we examine how best to proceed if we want to transfer to a group
a total subsidy of S. Once this is known, we examine the problem of which groups to tax
and which groups to subsidize, and by how much.
In order to provide a complete characterization of the optimal redistribution problem,
we now introduce restrictions on the distribution of i and j. Let pi denote the marginal
probability density function of i. For any i such that pi > 0 let pj (i) denote the probability
density function of j conditional on i and let Pj (i) =
∑j
k=1 pk (i) denote the associated
distribution function. We assume throughout the paper that the conditional distribution
of j conditional on i has full support for any group that has positive frequency; formally,
whenever pi > 0 then pj (i) > 0 for all j
17. Moreover, we impose the following regularity
condition.
Assumption 1: For any i,
Pj(i)
pj(i)
≥ 1
2
Pj−1(i)
pj−1(i)
+ 1
2
Pj+1(i)
pj+1(i)
for all j such that 1 < j < m.
Monotonicity of inverse hazard rates is a standard restriction in much of the screening
literature. For our purposes, it is more useful to require that the inverse hazard rate has
non-increasing increments.18 A simple distribution that satisfies this assumption is the uni-
form distribution. This is an attractive feature given that the uniform represents a diffuse
prior, which we want to permit since we know very little about the actual distribution of j.
Assumption 1 allows us to obtain simple and explicit solutions using standard methods of
proof. It can be shown19 that many of our qualitative results can be derived without this
assumption at the cost of substantially more analytical complications and less transparency.
Note that we place no restriction on the marginal distribution of i throughout the paper.
3.1 The Problem of Optimally Collecting Taxes
Consider the problem of how best to collect a total tax revenue T from a group of individuals
with market productivity i. Since we are treating i as observable, and j as unobservable, this
problem is almost a dual of Mirrlees’ original problem.20 As in many screening problems,
it is helpful to reduce the dimension of the optimization problem by exploiting the binding
17The qualifier “whenever pi > 0” applies to all statements we make about the conditional distribution of
j conditional on i and is suppressed in what follows.
18Since we do not impose monotonicity of the inverse hazard rate, Assumption 1 is neither stronger nor
weaker than monotonicity of the inverse hazard rate.
19See the working paper under Beaudry & Blackorby (2004).
20In contrast to Mirrlees’ analysis, which assumes that only income is observable, we assume that both the
time worked and income are observable. In Mirrlees’ model, the first-best would be implementable under our
assumptions. However, in addition, we also have the individual’s valuation of non-market time unobservable.
For a model with observable hours worked, but unobservable income and no further source of asymmetric
information, see Maskin and Riley (1985).
11
incentive compatibility constraints. To this end, let us first define vij as the optimal after-tax
excess income of type (i, j) by
vij ≡ max
ˆ
{hiˆ · (i− j)− Tiˆ} . (6)
Using this notation, Lemma 1 provides an equivalent formulation of the government’s prob-
lem.
Lemma 1 The government’s problem of levying a tax T from individuals with observable
market productivity i is equivalent to the following problem:
Wi(T ) ≡ max{hij}j=1,...,m,vim
m∑
j=1
pj (i) · U
(
j + vim +
m∑
k=j+1
hik
)
s.t.
m∑
j=1
pj (i) ·
(
hij · (i− j)− vim −
m∑
k=j+1
hik
)
= T,
hij ≥ hi,j+1 for j ≤ m− 1, vim ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ hij ≤ 1.
From the discussion above, we know that at the first-best allocation some individuals
have incentives to overstate their non-market type, j. Hence, the constraints ensuring that
no individual exaggerates his value of non-market time must be binding at the solution to the
constrained program; otherwise this solution would coincide with the first-best allocation,
which is not incentive compatible. In fact, the incentive constraint for any type (i, j) not
to mimic his right-wards adjacent type (i, j + 1) must be binding; if that were not the
case, then the allocation could be improved upon by simply changing the taxes Tij, leaving
the allocation of working times hij unchanged, to reduce the inequality without affecting
incentive compatibility. Imposing all the right-wards adjacent incentive constraints with
equality and solving recursively, we observe that an allocation can be optimal only if excess
incomes satisfy the condition
vij = vim +
m∑
k=j+1
hik. (7)
Working times satisfy the incentive compatibility condition (3) for fixed i only if they are
monotonic. Vice versa, the monotonicity condition and condition (7) are jointly sufficient
for conditions (3) and (4) for fixed i. Hence, substituting condition (7) into the original
objective function and the resource constraint gives rise to an equivalent representation of
the problem.
We now solve the reduced problem in Lemma 1. Assumption 1 implies that the solution
to the reduced problem satisfies the monotonicity constraint hij ≥ hi,j+1. Hence, we can
neglect this constraint. Taking derivative with respect to hij, we find that the effect of a
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marginal change in hij is
j−1∑
j′=1
pj′ (i) · U ′
(
j′ + vim +
m∑
k=j′+1
hik
)
+ λi · (pj (i) · (i− j)− Pj−1 (i)) (8)
where λi is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the resource constraint. An increase in hij
increases the incomes of all individuals with j′ < j, because, by the chain of binding incentive
compatibility constraints (and thus condition (7)), an increase in hij increases the rents that
have to be left to these types. This has two implications. First, it increases the utilities of
individuals with j′ < j in the government’s objective and second, it decreases the resources
available for redistribution. Finally, an increase in hij also directly affects the resources
available for redistribution by an amount pj (i) · (i− j) , the number of individuals with
value of non-market time j times their productivity gap between market and non-market
employment.
The structure of the solution to this problem becomes apparent when we study how this
trade-off changes with j. It is useful to divide (8) by Pj−1 (i) to obtain
j−1∑
j′=1
pj′ (i) · U ′
(
j′ + vim +
m∑
k=j′+1
hik
)
Pj−1 (i)
+ λi ·
(
pj (i)
Pj−1 (i)
· (i− j)− 1
)
. (9)
The first of these terms is the average marginal utility of individuals with value of non-market
time smaller than j; this term is non-increasing in j, since individuals with a higher value of
time are weakly better off than individuals with a lower value of time. The second term is
the productive gain from allocating individual (i, j) to market activities relative to the rent
cost of doing so. Assumption 1 implies that this term is decreasing in j. Thus the higher
is j the less attractive it is from a pure resource point of view to allocate the individual
to market activities. Indeed, the monotonicity properties of these trade-offs imply that the
optimal allocation takes a very simple form. It is optimal to let individuals with a small
value of non-market time work full time in the formal sector. Then, there is a marginal type
j = t, such that the optimal working time of type (i, t) exactly balances the marginal effects
in (9) . All types with value of non-market time higher than t do not work at all.
To complete the characterization of the optimum, we need to determine the identity of
the marginal type, t, and the hours this type spends in the formal sector, h∗it ≡ ht. Given the
structure of the solution, this is straightforward. Since h∗ij = 1 for j < t, the total incomes
of types (i, j) with j < t are independent of j, and we can express the first-order condition
for h∗it as
21
U ′ (t− 1 + ht) = λi ·
(
1− pt (i)
Pt−1 (i)
· (i− t)
)
. (10)
21Although not in general true, the assumption that m ≥ n implies that vim = 0.
13
From the incentive constraint of type (i, t− 1) , who must not have any incentive to mimic
the marginal type, (i, t) , we can recover the taxes paid by the inframarginal types. From
the participation constraint of the marginal type, we can recover the taxes the marginal type
pays. Substituting these amounts into the government’s budget constraint, we obtain
T = Pt−1 (i) · [i− (t− 1)− ht] + pt (i) · [ht · (i− t)] . (11)
t is then simply the largest j ≤ i such that equation (11) has a solution for some ht ∈ [0, 1] .
The solution exists only if T is at most equal to Tmax ≡ maxt≤i (i− (t− 1))Pt−1 (i) . If
T > Tmax, then there is no solution to the problem since it is not feasible to collect such a
high level of taxes. We summarize this discussion in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If the government wants to levy a tax revenue T from a group of individ-
uals with market productivity i, where T ≤ Tmax, then the optimal allocation partitions the
individuals into three groups. There is a marginal type j = t who works part-time, h∗it = ht,
pays taxes T ∗it = ht · (i − t), and has total income t. All individuals with j < t, work full
time, h∗ij = 1, pay taxes T
∗
ij = i − (t− 1) − ht, and have total incomes equal to t − 1 + ht.
Individuals with j > t do not work nor do they pay taxes.
To simplify notation, we have suppressed the fact that t and ht depend on i and T, but
this dependence is made explicit later on when needed. It is instructive to consider how
the solution depends on the amount of taxes to be collected, T. Suppose first T is small,
in particular smaller than Pi−1 (i) . Such a small amount of taxes can be collected without
distorting the allocation away from first-best. The identity of the marginal type is t = i and
the amount of taxes paid by the inframarginal types is T
Pi−1(i)
. The marginal type pays zero
taxes, but since he is indifferent as to where to work, we can have him spend time ht in the
formal sector. By the incentive constraint of the inframarginal types, ht determines the net
after-tax incomes of the inframarginal types. The higher is T, the smaller must be ht so that
we can extract more taxes from the inframarginal types. The amount T = Pi−1 (i) can only
be collected if type (i, i) does not work at all in the formal sector, ht = 0. If T is still higher,
then the identity of the marginal type changes to t = i− 1. Now the time the marginal type
spends in the market determines not only the incomes left to the inframarginal types, but
also - through the participation constraint of the marginal type - the taxes the marginal type
has to pay. For T < Tmax, the total amount of taxes collected is decreasing in ht; hence, the
higher is T , the less time the marginal type spends in the market. The maximum amount
of taxes that can be collected when the marginal type is type (i, i− 1) is equal to 2Pi−2 (i) .
Still higher amounts of taxes can only be collected if the identity of the marginal type is
decreased to t = i− 2, and so on. As long as T < Tmax, the identity of the marginal type is
a weakly decreasing function of T, and ht is a saw-tooth shaped function of T.
The allocation is second-best optimal for Pi−1 (i) < T ≤ Tmax. First, collecting more and
more taxes pushes more and more types out of the market, that is t < i. Second, for a fixed
marginal type, the time the marginal type spends in the market is generically sub-optimally
low so as to allow the government to collect more taxes from the inframarginal types, so
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ht < 1. Finally, a simple implication of Proposition 1 is that it is never optimal to subsidize
(impose a negative tax on) a subset of individuals among the considered group and tax the
others.
3.2 The Problem of Optimally Subsidizing
The incentive problems for a group that receives subsidies are diametrically opposed to the
incentive problems of those who are taxed. Heuristically, the government must remove the
incentive to claim that one’s productivity in the informal sector is lower than it in fact is.
The government wishes to help those with a lower productivity in the informal sector but it
does not want to give its money to those who fare well on their own. In what follows we use
the term “exclusion” as a synonym for not paying subsidies to an agent, and “inclusion” in
the opposite sense.
The government’s problem can be understood as a combined problem of exclusion and
redistribution. The optimum is characterized by the government wishing to subsidize all
agents whose productivity in the informal sector is less than or equal to s, where s is a
variable of its choice. Equivalently, the government wishes to exclude from subsidization all
agents whose non-market productivity is greater than or equal to s+1. For any given s, the
government’s problem is to distribute the available income to the agents that are included
in the redistribution program. Henceforth, we call type (i, s) the marginal type. We begin
again with the statement of an equivalent, but more tractable form of the government’s
problem.
Lemma 2 The government’s problem of distributing a subsidy S to individuals with observ-
able market productivity i is equivalent to the following program:
W˜i (S) ≡ max{hij}j=1,...,m,vi1,s
s∑
j=1
pj (i) · U
(
j + vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik
)
+
m∑
j=s+1
pj (i) · U (j) s.t.
s∑
j=1
pj (i) ·
(
hij · (i− j)−
(
vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik
))
+ S = 0,
vi1 −
s−1∑
k=1
hik ≥ 0 and vi1 −
s∑
k=1
hik ≤ 0,
hij ≥ hij+1 for all j < m− 1 and 0 ≤ hij ≤ 1.
At the first-best allocation, only incentive constraints to mimic types with a lower pro-
ductivity in the informal sector are binding. Hence, these constraints must be binding in the
solution to the government’s problem as well. Individuals are divided into two groups, one
group of individuals with j ≤ s receiving subsidies, the other with j > s not. Again a simple
optimization argument shows that for any type (i, j) with j ≤ s the constraint ensuring
that there is no incentive to mimic his left-wards adjacent type (i, j − 1) must be binding.
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Solving recursively for the after-tax excess incomes, we find that
vij = vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik for all j ≤ s. (12)
Only monotonic allocations of working time are incentive compatible, and condition (12) in
conjunction with the monotonicity constraint and vi1 −
s−1∑
k=1
hik ≥ 0 are jointly sufficient for
the incentive compatibility and participation constraints of all types with j ≤ s. Since the
types with value of non-market time of s + 1 and higher are excluded, they get zero excess
incomes. To make sure that all these types are indeed excluded, the allocation must be such
that type (i, s+ 1) would obtain a non-positive excess income if he mimicked the marginal
type. The allocation must satisfy the exclusion constraint vi1 −
s∑
k=1
hik ≤ 0.22 Since types
with value of non-market time higher than s + 1 find it even more costly to work in the
formal sector than type (i, s+ 1) does, the exclusion constraint excludes all types (i, j) with
j ≥ s+ 1.
Assumption 1 implies that the trade-off between an individual’s contribution to the re-
sources available for redistribution and the rents left to inframarginal types changes mono-
tonically as we increase nonmarket productivity. Therefore, there is a single marginal type,
who divides his fellow types into two groups. Those who have a lower value of non-market
time work full time and those with higher opportunity costs of time do not work at all. All
types who are subsidized receive the same amount of total income, so their marginal utili-
ties are equalized, which allows us to characterize the optimal allocation by the first-order
condition
U ′ (s+ hs) = λi ·
(
1− ps (i)
Ps (i)
(i− s)
)
(13)
where λi is the multiplier on the group’s resource constraint. To determine s and hs, we
recover the subsidies paid to inframarginal and marginal types, respectively, and substitute
these expressions into the government’s budget constraint
Ps−1 (i) · [s− i+ hs] + ps (i) · hs · [s+ 1− i] = S. (14)
s is then the highest j ≥ i such that equation (14) has a solution for some hs ∈ (0, 1]. We
summarize this discussion:
Proposition 2 If the government wants to distribute a total subsidy S to a group of individ-
uals with market productivity i, then the optimal allocation takes the following form. Individ-
uals are partitioned into three groups. There is a marginal type with nonmarket productivity
j = s, who works part time, h∗is = hs, receives a subsidy equal to −Tis = hs · (s+ 1− i) , and
22The exclusion and inclusion constraints make this model different from standard problems and from the
previous taxation problem. For a general analysis of participation constraints in adverse selection models,
see Jullien (2000).
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has an after-tax income of s+hs. Types with nonmarket productivity smaller than s work full
time, h∗ij = 1 for j < s, receive subsidies equal to −Tij = s − i + hs and have total incomes
equal to s + hs. Types with nonmarket productivities larger than s do not work, h
∗
ij = 0 for
j > s, do not receive subsidies, and have incomes equal to j.
The intuition for this result is similar to the one for the taxation case, but there are
nonetheless important differences. First, as we have explained above, the binding incentive
constraints are left-ward looking; individuals want to claim that their productivity in the
informal market is less than it actually is. Second, there is an additional exclusion constraint
and this must be binding. If this constraint were slack, then there would be no reason to put
the marginal type to work in the formal sector. But S > 0 implies that the marginal type’s
productivity in the formal sector must be lower than his productivity in the informal sector,
so absent any binding constraint this type would spend no time in the formal sector. But then
the allocation cannot be incentive compatible, because all types with higher productivity in
the informal sector than the marginal type, and who should be excluded from receiving
subsidies, can claim the subsidy targeted at the marginal type without cost. Put differently,
the allocation forces some individuals to spend (part of) their time inefficiently in the market.
This working requirement serves as a screening device that discourages individuals with a
high value of nonmarket time from claiming the subsidies targeted at those with lower values
of nonmarket time.
It is again instructive to investigate how the solution depends on the level of subsidies
distributed, S. Suppose first that S is rather small, in particular smaller than Pi (i) . Then,
the marginal type is s = i. Since the marginal type is indifferent as to where to work, we
can allocate him to the formal sector. hs is increasing in S for S smaller than Pi (i) . For
S = Pi (i) , the marginal type works full time in the formal sector. If we want to distribute a
higher amount of subsidies, we have to adjust the identity of the marginal type to s = i+1.
For Pi (i) < S ≤ 2Pi+1 (i) , the hours spent by the marginal type in the formal sector are
again increasing in S. So, the identity of the marginal type is a weakly increasing function
of S and the hours spent by the marginal type in the formal sector is increasing in S. By the
binding exclusion constraint the variable hs serves to screen out types that receive a higher
income by not working than the subsidized individuals who work receive. hs is strictly
positive unless S is so large that there is no type left to screen out. This happens when
S ≥ Pm−1(m− i), so that all types have an income that is at least equal to m. In that case
there is no need to screen anybody out, and the marginal type need not work in the formal
sector. However, this case can never arise at an overall optimum, when we endogeneize the
amount of redistribution, so we can safely neglect this case.
Note that the allocation is such that employment decisions are weakly upward distorted.
Since s ≥ i, with a strict inequality when S > Pi (i) , some types are allocated to market
activities although they would be more productive when allocated to non-market activities.
Moreover, the marginal type spends a positive amount of time in the market although, for
s > i, he would be more productive at informal activities. Finally, we observe again that it
is never optimal to collect taxes from some individuals with market productivity i if some
other individuals with the same market productivity receive subsidies.
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3.3 Optimal Redistribution with 2 Observable Market Types
We now consider the case where there are two market types i ∈ {i′, i′′} and many unob-
servable non-market types. Let pi′ denote the probability that i = i
′ and let pi′′ denote the
probability that i = i′′.23 The government chooses T , the amount of taxes collected from one
group, and S the amount to give to the other group, in order to maximize the expected util-
ity of the entire population. In this case, it is obvious that it is optimal to levy a tax on the
group with the higher market productivity, and subsidize the group with i = i′. The budget
constraint links T and S through the condition pi′′T = pi′S. We can write the government’s
problem as
max
T,S
{
pi′′Wi′′(T ) + pi′W˜i′(S)
}
s.t. pi′′T = pi′S and T ≤ Tmax.
Whenever an optimum exists, then the optimal levels of T and S, denoted T ∗ and S∗, satisfy
either
−∂Wi′′(T
∗)
∂T
=
∂W˜i′(S
∗)
∂S
(15)
or T ∗ = Tmax, S∗ = pi′′
pi′
Tmax and −∂Wi′′ (Tmax)
∂T
<
∂W˜i′ (
pi′′
pi′
Tmax)
∂S
.
Invoking the envelope theorem, we observe that condition (15) requires the equality of
the shadow costs of taxation and subsidization. Recalling our previous propositions, we can
express the condition in terms of the variables t, ht, s, and hs. The result is formally stated
as
Proposition 3 The solution of the government’s redistribution problem when there are two
observable market productivities must satisfy either
U ′ (t− 1 + ht)
U ′ (s+ hs)
=
1− pt(i′′)
Pt−1(i′′)
· (i′′ − t)
1− ps(i′)
Ps(i′) · (i′ − s)
where t, s, ht and hs satisfy the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 or T = T
max and
U ′ (t− 1 + ht)
U ′ (s+ hs)
<
1− pt(i′′)
Pt−1(i′′)
· (i′′ − t)
1− ps(i′)
Ps(i′) · (i′ − s)
.
We omit a formal proof of this result, because it directly follows from the discussion
preceding the Proposition. The four objects t, s, ht and hs are all functions of the total
tax to be levied on the high market productivity group. Hence, this proposition implicitly
defines the optimal level T to levy on these types, and the government’s budget constraint
indicates how much to subsidize in total the low market productivity group. Then, given the
23Alternatively, in terms of our general notation, this corresponds to the case where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and
the probability distribution puts zero probability on all i /∈ {i′, i′′} .
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optimal levels of total taxes and total subsidies, Propositions 1 and 2 indicate the associated
individual levels of taxes and the individual levels of subsidies that support the optimal
allocation. Hence, Proposition 3, in conjunction with Propositions 1 and 2, offers a complete
characterization of the optimal redistribution problem with two observable market types.24
We illustrate the properties of the optimal allocation in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The second-best allocation for individuals with market productivity i′ (left panel)
and i′′ (right panel) are depicted below. The dots are pre-tax incomes (ih + (1 − h)j) and
the circles are total income (ih + (1 − h)j − T ). The triangles are hours worked in market
activities.
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The second best optimal amount of redistribution is clearly smaller than the first-best
amount. To see this, recall that the first-best allocation equalizes the incomes of all individ-
uals who work in the formal sector. This is too costly with asymmetric information. The
cost of taxation in the high productivity group is that more and more individuals are driven
out of the market the higher is T. The cost of subsidization in the low productivity group is
that more and more people who would be relatively more productive in the informal sector
have to work in the formal sector the higher is T (and thus the higher is S). As a result, the
incomes of the working individuals with market productivity i′′ are strictly higher than the
incomes of the individuals with productivity i′.
3.4 Many Observable Market Characteristics
We now generalize our findings to the case of many observed market characteristics and many
unobservable non-market productivities. This problem can be stated as finding a sequence of
24In general our solution is second-best optimal, but it is easy to verify that in the special case where
i′′ = i′ + 1, the first best allocation is actually implemented by this solution.
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total taxes, Ti for i = {1, . . . , n}, where an element Ti represents the total tax levied on the
group of individuals with market productivity i, a negative value of Ti represents a subsidy;
Ti equals zero when pi = 0. For any two groups for which the maximal tax capacity is not
attained, it must be that the marginal cost of taxation is equalized. In particular, if groups
i′′ and i′ are subsidized (negative value of Ti), it must be the case that
U ′ (s (i′′, Ti′′) + hs (i′′, Ti′′))(
1−
p
s(i′′,Ti′′)
(i′′)
P
s(i′′,Ti′′)
(i′′) (i
′′ − s (i′′, Ti′′))
) = U ′ (s (i′, Ti′) + hs (i′, Ti′))(
1−
p
s(i′,Ti′)
(i′)
P
s(i′,Ti′)
(i′) (i
′ − s (i′, Ti′))
) . (16)
In (16), we make explicit the dependence of s and hs on i and the total tax paid by a group.
Similarly, if group i′′ has a positive value of total taxes, Ti > 0, and group i′ is subsidized, it
must be the case that either
U ′ (t (i′′, Ti′′)− 1 + ht (i′′, Ti′′))(
1−
p
t(i′′,Ti′′)
(i′′)
P
t(i′′,Ti′′)−1
(i′′) (i
′′ − t (i′′, Ti′′))
) = U ′ (s (i′, Ti′) + hs (i′, Ti′))(
1−
p
s(i′,Ti′)
(i′)
P
s(i′,Ti′)
(i′) (i
′ − s (i′, Ti′))
) (17)
or Ti = T
max (i′′) ≡ maxt≤i′′ (i′′ − (t− 1))Pt−1 (i′′) and condition (17) holds as an inequality.
A similar condition applies if two groups are taxed. These conditions, in addition to the
government’s budget constraint,
n∑
i=1
pi · Ti = 0, determine the optimal level of total taxes
and subsidies for each group. To get further insights into the structure of the solution, we
assume from now on that the optimum is described by an interior solution. One interesting
question is who gets taxed and who gets subsidized. This is addressed in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 There is a critical market productivity i such that individuals are taxed only
if their market productivity satisfies i ≥ i. Individuals are subsidized only if their market
productivity satisfies i < i.
This proposition indicates that an optimal redistribution plan has the property that in-
dividuals are taxed or subsidized depending on whether their market productivity falls short
of or exceeds a critical value. In other words, Proposition 4 indicates that the determinant
of whether individuals should be taxed or subsidized is not their market income but instead
it is their market wage rate. The intuition for the proof is as follows. Suppose the result
were not true, and there were two groups i′′ > i′ where group i′′ is subsidized and group i′
is taxed. We know from Propositions 1 and 2 that the employment decisions are distorted
upwards in the subsidized group, so s ≥ i′′, and that the employment decisions are distorted
downwards in the group that is taxed, so i′ ≥ t. The after-tax incomes of the individuals
in group i′′ are equal to max {s+ hs, j} and the after-tax incomes of group i′ are equal to
max {t− 1 + ht, j} . So, the effect of such a policy is to increase the dispersion in incomes,
which is obviously suboptimal. We show in the appendix that there is also an incentive
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compatible and budget neutral way to improve such an allocation, so it can never be part of
an optimum.
More generally, one can ask how the after-tax incomes of individuals change with their
market productivity. Said differently, how many individuals are pushed out of market ac-
tivities due to taxation and are allocated to market activities due to subsidization? To
perform these comparative statics exercises, we impose another regularity condition on the
distribution of types. In particular, we assume that pi > 0 for all i, and moreover we impose:
Assumption 2: For any j,
Pj(i)
pj(i)
≥ 1
2
Pj(i−1)
pj(i−1) +
1
2
Pj(i+1)
pj(i+1)
for all i such that 1 < i < n.
Similar to Assumption 1, we require that the inverse hazard rate has non-increasing in-
crements, but here we require the property to hold for the conditioning variable i. A simple
and natural case that satisfies Assumption 2 is when market and non-market productivi-
ties are independent of each other. However, Assumption 2 holds more generally when—
heuristically—market and non-market productivities are more strongly correlated the higher
the level of market productivity. More precisely, we show in the appendix that the inverse
hazard rate has non-increasing increments in i if the strength of affiliation between market
and non-market productivity is non-decreasing in the level of market productivity. We have
the following result:
Proposition 5 The after-tax incomes of individuals who work in the formal sector, both
within the groups that are taxed and within groups that are subsidized, are non-decreasing in
i. Moreover, the identity of the marginal types is non-decreasing in i.
To understand the role of Assumption 2 for the result, recall the first-order conditions
(10) and (13) , that determine the after-tax incomes of the inframarginal types in taxed and
in subsidized groups, respectively. If the benefit-cost ratios on the right-hand sides of these
expressions change monotonically in i then the marginal utility expressions on the left-hand
sides will adjust the same way at the optimum. Assumption 2 implies precisely this.
To understand this in more detail, consider a special case when i and j are independent.
In this case, for any two individuals with non-market productivity j and market productivity
i and i+1, respectively, the relative frequency of types with nonmarket productivity j relative
to types with smaller nonmarket productivities is the same. However, for the individual in
group i the productivity gap between the two activities is i− j, while the productivity gap
in group i+ 1 is i+ 1− j. Hence, increasing market productivity implies that the benefit of
allocating the individual to market activities increases while the cost of doing so - in terms
of foregone rents that have to be given away to types with smaller nonmarket productivities
- is held constant. Therefore, at the optimum all individuals with market productivity i+ 1
will work at least as much in the formal sector as those do with market productivity i. By
incentive compatibility, through conditions (7) or (12) , respectively, depending on whether
the groups are taxed or subsidized, the allocation of working times determines the net excess
incomes of these individuals. Hence, if individuals with higher market productivity spend
weakly more time in the formal sector, the resulting total incomes and the identity of the
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marginal individual must be weakly higher in the group with the higher market productivity.
Distributions that satisfy Assumption 2 are sufficiently regular that any changes in the inverse
hazard rate due to a change in market productivity do not outweigh the positive effect on
the productivity gap.
4 Unobservable Market and Non-Market Productivi-
ties
Throughout the previous section we assumed that market productivities were observable by
the government. In this section, we relax this assumption and consider the main case of
interest where individuals can claim to have market productivities lower than that given by
their innate ability as well as being able to lie about their informal market productivities.
First, we prove formally that it is indeed optimal to allocate each individual working in
the formal sector to his most productive market task.
Proposition 6 For any incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced al-
location in which wij < i for some (i, j) , there exists an incentive compatible, individually
rational, and budget balanced allocation that satisfies wij = i for all (i, j) that Pareto domi-
nates the former allocation.
The idea is simply to change the taxes without changing the allocation of working times
and without violating any of the constraints.
Adding a second dimension of asymmetric information usually increases the number of
incentive constraints dramatically, because individuals can mimic others who differ from
them both in the value of market and non-market time. However, our problem differs from
the usual problem of multidimensional screening. If we had a problem of the usual sort,
an individual’s excess income would depend on the vector (i, ıˆ, j, ˆ) , which contains both
preference parameters and messages in both dimensions. Here, the agent’s after-tax excess
incomes hıˆˆ · (ˆı− j) − Tıˆˆ depend only on the vector (ˆı, j, ˆ) but only implicitly on the true
ability parameter i through the fact that an individual can mimic only those individuals who
are assigned to market tasks that require at most productiviy i. The fact that the after-tax
excess income is independent of i implies that when the individual mimics a less qualified
person with the same productivity in the informal sector, he obtains exactly the same excess
income as that person obtains. This insight allows us to prove the following result:
Proposition 7 The two-dimensional incentive constraint (3) is satisfied if and only if this
pair of one-dimensional constraints is satisfied for all (i, j)
hij · (i− j)− Tij ≥ hıˆj · (ˆı− j)− Tıˆj ∀ıˆ ≤ i (18)
and
hij · (i− j)− Tij ≥ hiˆ · (i− j)− Tiˆ ∀ˆ. (19)
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Proof. The only if part is trivial. So, consider the sufficiency part. Suppose (18) and
(19) are satisfied and consider type (i, j) which mimics type (ˆı, ˆ) for ıˆ ≤ i. The excess income
he obtains this way is exactly the excess income that type (ˆı, j) obtains from mimicking type
(ˆı, ˆ) . But by (19) applied to type (ˆı, j), it would be better for type (i, j) to mimic type
(ˆı, j) ; but then, by (18) it would even be better to state the true type (i, j) , which implies
that incentive compatibility is satisfied for an arbitrary ˆ and ıˆ ≤ i.
Proposition 7 is an important simplification, since it reduces the number of relevant
incentive constraints dramatically.25 Moreover, it allows us to show that all of our results
found for the case of observable market types carry over to the current case.
Proposition 8 For distributions that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, e.g., when nonmarket
productivities are independent and uniformly distributed, the optimal allocation with observ-
able market characteristics remains incentive compatible when market characteristics are not
observable.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 8 consists of pulling together the implications of all
the preceding propositions. Our solution procedure for the case of observable market pro-
ductivites ensured that constraint (19) is taken care of. Given Proposition 7, it suffices to
check whether our solution satisfies also condition (18) . From Propositions 1 through 3 we
know that with two market productivities, incomes in the group that is taxed are weakly
higher than incomes in the group that is subsidized, because redistribution is suboptimally
low at the optimum. Proposition 4 states that with many market productivities, there is
a group with the smallest market productivity i = i among all the groups that are taxed.
Since t (i, Ti) ≤ i for Ti ≥ 0 and s (i− 1, Ti−1) ≥ i for Ti−1 ≤ 0, the incomes in group i
are weakly higher than the incomes in group i − 1. Proposition 5 showed that the incomes
of those who work some time in the formal sector are non-decreasing in i for i ≥ i and for
i < i. Taken together, these results imply that the incomes of those who work are monotonic
in i for all i. For individuals who do not work at the optimum, they receive their outside
option, j, regardless of whether they are honest or whether they mimic an individual with
a lower market productivity. This follows from the fact that the identity of the marginal
type is non-decreasing in i. Finally, observe that the government can never do better when it
cannot observe i than when it can observe i. Hence, when it is feasible to implement the same
solution as with observed market productivities, then it is optimal to do so. Hence the solu-
tion to the family of screening problems conditional on i that we have found characterized
in Section 3 represents the solution to the overall screening problem. 26
25Notice that Propositions 6 and 7 do not depend on either Assumption 1 or 2.
26As an example that violates Assumption 2 and where it is not possible to solve the entire problem by
solving a family of screening problems conditional on i, suppose there are two groups i′′ and i′′ + 1 that
are taxed and let almost all individuals in group i′′ + 1 have j = 1 and almost all individuals in group i′′
have j = i′′. Clearly, individuals in group i′′ drop out of formal market activities quickly when taxed, while
individuals in group i′′ + 1 have less attractive outside options within their group. But if the government
wishes to levy a large Ti′′+1, then the outside options across groups become relevant in this example. Hence,
the allocation for group i′′ places a constraint on the feasible allocations for group i′′ + 1.
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5 The Structure of Income Taxes and Subsidies
Our analysis of the informationally constrained redistribution problem has allowed us to
derive properties of an optimal tax system in the form of a direct revelation mechanism.
However, in practice, tax systems do not take this form. Instead, tax systems are more akin
to indirect revelation mechanism. For example, in the introduction, we discussed a simplified
tax system that depended on one’s income and one’s wage rate. We can call such a system
a wage contingent income tax system, and denote such as system by the function Tˆ (w, y)
where y = w · h is income. In this section, we describe the properties of the wage contingent
income tax system that implements the solution to our optimal redistribution problem.27
In this case, we are assuming the government can observe both workers’ incomes, and their
wage rate. Obviously, this is equivalent to assuming the government can observe income and
hours worked.
The first notable property, which follows directly from Proposition 4, is that there exists
a critical wage w, such that Tˆ (w, y) ≥ 0 for all y if w > w, and Tˆ (w, y) ≤ 0 for all y if w ≤ w.
This observation emphasizes that being taxed versus subsidized depends first and foremost
on one’s wage, not on income. The second striking property is that Tˆ (w, y) = 0 if y = 0,
that is, individuals that choose not to work do not get any subsidies. This result, which is
implied by the nature of the direct tax functions derived in Propositions 1 and 2, implies
the absence of welfare payments for employable individuals. This is in stark contrast to
the traditional optimal tax literature which generally prescribes positive welfare payments
to individuals who do not choose to work. In our setup, it is always better to use wage
contingent employment subsidies to redistribute income since this allows the government to
target workers with poor options both within and outside the market.28
The third property relates to the nature of marginal tax rates and marginal subsidies. In
particular, one can show that a wage contingent income tax system implements the optimal
allocation only if it is convex in income over all levels of income that are achieved by some
type in equilibrium. This indicates that an optimal wage-contingent income tax system has
the property that as an individual increases his income (by increasing his hours worked), he
faces either weakly increasing marginal tax rates if his wage rate is high, or alternatively
faces weakly decreasing marginal income subsidies if his wage rate is low. In other words,
negative marginal tax rates are weakly increasing as an individual increases his income. As
an example, the following piece-wise linear tax schedule could be used to implement the
optimal allocation.
27Since the function hij which prescribes the optimal allocations is monotonic in j (for a given i), it is easy
to verify that a wage-contingent income tax schedule can be used to implement the optimal redistribution
problem.
28The result that the optimal program prescribes an absence of transfers to individuals that choose not
to work may appear extreme, especially since it runs counter to common practice in most countries. Some
qualifications apply to this result and should be kept in mind. For instance, the analysis is meant to apply to
employable individuals with no observable characteristics which would favor an allocation of time toward non-
market activities. Hence the analysis is not structured to handle individuals that have dependent children,
or individuals with handicaps which make employment difficult.
24
For an individual being paid a wage above the critical level w > w, and earning income
y, then taxes are given by
Tˆ (w, y) =
{ (
1− t
w
) · y for y ≤ y ≡ ht · w(
1− t
w
) · y + (y − y) · (1− t−1
w
)
for y > y.
For an individual begin paid a wage below the critical level w ≤ w, then subsidies are given
by
−Tˆ (w, y) =
{ (
s+1
w
− 1) · y for y ≤ y ≡ hs · w(
s+1
w
− 1) · y + (y − y) · ( s
w
− 1) for y > y
In the above, the indices t, s and the work hours ht, hs are a function of the market produc-
tivity i and are determined as in Propositions 1 and 2, in conjunction with the conditions
presented in Section 3.4. As can be seen, this tax schedule has the property that marginal
taxes are weakly increasing for individuals with w > w since
(
1− t
w
)
<
(
1− t−1
w
)
. Similarly,
marginal subsidies are decreasing for low wage individuals since
(
s+1
w
− 1) > ( s
w
− 1).
In summary, our analysis implies that a wage-contingent tax system has the following four
properties: (1) the existence of a cutoff wage, where individuals with wages above the cutoff
are taxed and individuals with wages below the cutoff are subsidized, (2) individuals below
the cutoff wage face wage-contingent marginal income subsidies that decrease as income
increases, (3) individuals above the cutoff wage face positive and increasing marginal tax
rates as income increases, and (4) individuals who choose not to work receive no income
transfer.
Throughout this analysis, we have been assuming that the government can observe both
a worker’s income and his wage rate (or hours worked). For many individuals this appears
to be a reasonable assumption since many social programs in industrialized countries are
based on such information and these programs appear to function properly. However, for
some individuals, especially many high market productivity individuals, this assumption is
unlikely to hold in practice. It is therefore relevant to ask how our results would need to
be modified if governments could not observe hours worked for individuals paid at high
wage rates. Without providing a full analysis here, such a modification would not change
the flavor of our main results if the unobservability of hours or wages arose (mainly) for
individuals with market productivity above the critical level associated with subsidization.
In this case, the government could run a standard income tax system (based only on income)
plus a separate earned-income subsidy system where individuals would need to have verifiable
income and hours (or wages) statements to be eligible for a subsidy. While the tax system
would be less efficient in the absence of information on hours worked, the subsidy system
could still avoid transferring income to individuals with high value of time outside the market
by requiring them to prove that they are working at low paying jobs. What is crucial for
most of our results is the observability of hours (or wages) for potentially subsidized jobs;
the observability of hours for high paying jobs is less critical.
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6 Conclusion
The object of this paper is to explore the principles that govern the design of an optimal
redistribution program in which taxation authorities have both reasons and tools to favor
programs that target transfers more effectively than simple negative income tax schemes.29
To this end we have analyzed a variant of the optimal taxation problem pioneered by Mirrlees.
Our departure consists of allowing for a greater scope of unobserved heterogeneity in the
population and allowing the government to transfer income based on both market income
and market labor supply. Our main finding is that, in contrast to much of the optimal
taxation literature, optimal redistribution in this environment is achieved using employment
subsidies on low market performers, positive marginal tax rates on high market performers,
and no transfers to non-working individuals.
How should these results be interpreted? In our view, these results are not a call for
redesigning income tax systems to include a dependence on wages. Instead we view these
results as supporting the potential relevance of certain active labor market programs as a
complement to income tax as a means of redistributing income.30 For example, these results
provide potential support for programs, such as the UK Working Tax Credit and Canadian
Self-Sufficiency Project, which supplement the income of low wage earners who choose to
work, making transfers contingent on both income and time worked.31 More generally, we
view our results as suggesting the use of work time information to implement phased-out wage
subsidies as a means of redistributing income to low wage earners, that is, wage subsidies
that decrease in intensity as an individual chooses to supply more labor. Such phased-out
subsidy programs, in effect, allow substantial transfers to the most needy in society without
inciting either high market-value individuals or high non-market value individuals to take
advantage of it.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We begin showing that the monotonicity condition, hij ≥ hi,j+1 for
j ≤ m− 1, is necessary for incentive compatibility. Consider type (i, j) and a deviation to (i, ˆ) :
hij · (i− j)− Tij ≥ hiˆ · (i− j)− Tiˆ.
29Avenues of future research include examining the value of rendering some informal activities observable
through monitoring, and rendering the acquisition of skill endogenous.
30We also view these results as providing minimal guidelines of how such programs should interact with
the income tax system in terms of the implied pattern of effective marginal tax rates.
31The result that governments may want to include work requirements in the design of transfer programs
is derived here under the assumption of a utilitarian/welfarist government. Moffitt (2006) derives a simi-
lar result under the assumption that the government has preferences over the work allocation of transfer
recipients.
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Now, consider type (i, ˆ) (interchanging type and message) and a deviation to (i, j) :
hiˆ · (i− ˆ)− Tiˆ ≥ hij · (i− ˆ)− Tij .
Rearranging, we have
(hij − hiˆ) (ˆ− j) ≥ 0
which proves the claim.
Next we argue that vij = vim +
m∑
k=j+1
hik and hij non-increasing in j are sufficient for incentive
compatibility. To ease notation, define
V (i, ˆ, j) ≡ hiˆ · (i− j)− Tiˆ
The condition vij = vim +
m∑
k=j+1
hik results from imposing the right-wards adjacent incentive con-
straints with equality and solving recursively. To see this, suppose the right-ward adjacent con-
straint holds with equality. Then,
hij · (i− j)− Tij = hi,j+1 · (i− j)− Ti,j+1
= hi,j+1 · (i− (j + 1))− Ti,j+1 + hi,j+1.
So, V (i, j, j) = V (i, j + 1, j + 1) + hi,j+1. Applying this logic repeatedly and solving recursively,
gives expression (7) . We wish to show that (7) and monotonicity of hij jointly imply that any
deviation from truth-telling is suboptimal. Notice that the excess income that type (i, j) obtains
from mimicking type (i, l) is given by
V (i, l, j) = hil · (i− j)− Til
= hil · (i− l)− Til − (j − l) · hil
= V (i, l, l)− (j − l) · hil.
Thus, V (i, j, j) ≥ V (i, l, j) for any l and j if
V (i,m,m) +
m∑
k=j+1
hik ≥ V (i,m,m) +
m∑
k=l+1
hik − (j − l) · hil.
Consider first any l > j. We can write the comparison as
V (i,m,m) +
m∑
k=l+1
hik + hi,j+1 + ...+ hil
≥ V (i,m,m) +
m∑
k=l+1
hik − (j − l) · hil
Cancelling equal terms on both sides we can simplify the condition to
hi,j+1 + ...+ hil ≥ (l − j) · hil.
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Since the number of terms on each side is the same, and hj is non-increasing in j, the inequality is
satisfied. The proof for the case where l < j is similar and therefore omitted.
Consider now the participation constraints. From the right-wards adjacent incentive constraints,
V (i, j, j) = V (i, j + 1, j) ≥ V (i, j + 1, j + 1) , and from the participation constraint of type (i,m),
V (i,m,m) ≥ 0, all the participation constraints are satisfied.
Next, we show that all the incentive constraints must hold with equality. To see this, suppose
there is a type (i, j) such that
V (i, j, j) > V (i, j + 1, j + 1) + hi,j+1.
Then we can change the incentive system as follows. We can find ε1, ε2 > 0 to change the taxes to
T˜ij = Tij + ε1 and T˜i,j+1 = Ti,j+1 − ε2.
The effect is to reduce type (i, j)′ s after-tax excess income and to increase type (i, j + 1)′ s after-
tax excess income. Let V˜ (i, j, j) and V˜ (i, j + 1, j + 1) , respectively, denote the resulting after-tax
excess incomes. Recall that pj (i) denotes the conditional probability that the non-market pro-
ductivity takes value j conditional on i. Since we do not change the allocation of types’ (i, j)
and (i, j + 1) working time, we have to respect the condition pj (i) · ε1 = pj+1 (i) · ε2. By con-
struction,
(
V (i, j, j)
V (i, j + 1, j + 1)
)
can be viewed as generated from
(
V˜ (i, j, j)
V˜ (i, j + 1, j + 1)
)
by a
mean-preserving spread. Since U (·) is concave, the latter gives the objective function a higher
value.
Finally, we can recover the taxes collected from the allocation of work time and the optimal
after-tax excess incomes using the relation vij = hij · (i− j)− Tij and (7) . We obtain
Tij = hij · (i− j)− vim −
m∑
k=j+1
hik (20)
Substituting condition (20) into the objective function and the resource constraint gives the repre-
sentation of the problem in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is given in two parts. In the first part, we characterize
the optimal allocation. In the second part, we use the structure of the optimal allocation to derive
the budget constraint.
Part i: the structure of the allocation
The Lagrangian for our problem takes the form
Li =
m∑
j=1
pj (i) · U
j + vim + m∑
k=j+1
hik

+λi ·
 m∑
j=1
pj (i) ·
hij · (i− j)− vim − m∑
k=j+1
hik
− T
 .
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For notational ease in this proof, let the marginal utility of type (i, j) be
uij ≡ U ′
j + vim + m∑
k=j+1
hik
 .
The derivative of Li with respect to hi1 is equal to
∂Li
∂hi1
= λi · (i− 1) · p1(i)
which implies directly that h∗i1 = 1 since i− 1 ≥ 0.
The derivative of Li with respect to hiz is equal to
∂Li
∂hiz
=
z−1∑
j=1
pj (i) · uij + λi · (pz (i) · (i− z)− Pz−1 (i)) .
In what follows, we will make repeated use of a convenient transformation. Define
E [uij | j ≤ z − 1] ≡
z−1∑
j=1
pj (i)
Pz−1 (i)
· uij .
We prove that our problem admits an interior solution for at most one hiz. The derivative of Li
with respect to hiz for z > 1 is proportional to
∂Li
∂hiz
Pz−1 (i)
= E [uij | j ≤ z − 1] + λi ·
(
pz (i)
Pz−1 (i)
· (i− z)− 1
)
. (21)
Suppose (21) admits an interior solution for z = t, so the first-order condition holds:
E [uij | j ≤ t− 1] = λi ·
(
1− pt (i)
Pt−1 (i)
· (i− t)
)
.
E [uij | j ≤ z − 1] is non-increasing in z. To see this, note that incomes are non-decreasing in op-
portunity costs, since by incentive compatibility
j + 1 +
m∑
k=j+2
hik −
j + m∑
k=j+1
hik
 = 1− hi,j+1 ≥ 0. (22)
Hence, to prove our claim, it suffices to show that the expression pz(i)Pz−1(i) · (i− z) is decreasing in z,
because that implies that the first-order condition cannot hold for z > t. So we want to show that
pz (i)
Pz−1 (i)
· (i− z) > pz+1 (i)
Pz (i)
· (i− (z + 1)) .
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Let a ≡ i− z. With these definitions, the condition is equivalent to
a
pi−a (i)
Pi−a−1 (i)
> (a− 1) pi−a+1 (i)
Pi−a (i)
.
The condition is trivially satisfied for a = 1; so assume that a > 1. Multiplying both sides by
Pi−a(i)
pi−a+1(i) ·
Pi−a−1(i)
pi−a(i) and rearranging we have the equivalent condition
Pi−a−1 (i)
pi−a (i)
> a ·
(
Pi−a−1 (i)
pi−a (i)
− Pi−a (i)
pi−a+1 (i)
)
. (23)
Notice that the condition is trivially satisfied if the inverse hazard rate is non-decreasing in j,
because that makes the expression on the right-hand side become negative, while the expression
on the left-hand side is strictly positive. However, suppose the inverse hazard rate is decreasing so
that the right-hand side is strictly positive. In that case, (23) is still satisfied, provided that
Pi−a−1 (i)
pi−a (i)
≥ Pi−1 (i)
pi (i)
+ a ·
(
Pi−a−1 (i)
pi−a (i)
− Pi−a (i)
pi−a+1 (i)
)
.
Rearranging, we have
Pi−a−1 (i)
pi−a (i)
+ a
(
Pi−a (i)
pi−a+1 (i)
− Pi−a−1 (i)
pi−a (i)
)
≥ Pi−1 (i)
pi (i)
. (24)
Assumption 1 implies that Pj(i)pj−1(i) −
Pj−1(i)
pj(i)
is non-increasing, which in turn implies that (24) is
satisfied. Hence, the solution for z > t is h∗iz = 0.
Part ii: derivation of the resource constraint
Using the particular allocation, the tax paid by the marginal type satisfies ht · (i− t) = Tit
because this type’s participation constraint is binding. The excess income of type (i, t− 1) satisfies
V (i, t− 1, t− 1) = V (i, t, t− 1) = ht, so his total income is equal to t− 1 + ht. The taxes he pays
satisfy the relation i− (t− 1)− Ti,t−1 = ht, so
Ti,t−1 = i− ((t− 1) + ht) .
Since the marginal utilities of all inframarginal types are the same, all their incomes are the same,
so the taxes paid by all inframarginal types are the same. Summing the taxes together we obtain
the expression in the text:
T = Pt−1 (i) · (i− ((t− 1) + ht)) + pt (i) · ht · (i− t) .
Let Tmax ≡ maxt≤i (i− (t− 1))Pt−1 (i) and τ ≡ argmaxt≤i (i− (t− 1))Pt−1 (i) . Given Assump-
tion 1, τ exists and is unique. We can compute t and ht as follows, generalizing the procedure
described in the text. For x ∈ N+ ∪ 0 and T satisfying
xPi−a < T ≤ (x+ 1)Pi−(x+1)
we set
t = i− x.
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This solution is feasible if and only if t ≥ τ. The time spent by the marginal type in the formal
sector satisfies
ht =
T − (x+ 1)Pi−(x+1) (i)
xpi−x (i)− Pi−(x+1) (i)
.
Proof of Lemma 2. In contrast to Lemma 1, the left-wards adjacent constraints must bind
whenever the left-wards neighbor is working in the formal sector. Imposing these constraints and
solving recursively, we find that
vij = vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik (25)
for any type who is supposed to be included in the redistribution program.
It can be shown that the left-ward adjacent incentive constraints plus monotonicity imply that
there is no profitable deviation from truth-telling. Since this is standard, it is omitted. Second,
following the same proof as in Lemma 1, one can show that the adjacent constraints must be tight
for all types that work in the formal sector. To avoid repetition, this step is omitted as well.
If the government wishes to include type (i, s) , then
vis = vi1 −
s−1∑
k=1
hik ≥ 0.
The participation constraint of type (i, s) implies that all types (i, j) for j < s also want to
participate. On the other hand, the exclusion constraint for type (i, s+ 1) ,
vis+1 = vi1 −
s∑
k=1
hik ≤ 0
implies that all types (i, j) for j > s + 1 are also excluded. In particular, if type (i, s+ 2) mimics
the marginal type (i, s) he obtains a net excess income of
V (i, s, s+ 2) = V (i, 1, 1)−
s∑
k=1
hik − his = −his < 0
An analogous argument can be given for any type (i, j) for j > s+ 1.
Finally, using
vij =
 vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik for j ≤ s
0 otherwise,
one can recover the subsidies paid to types (i, j) for j ≤ s. Substituting the resulting expressions
into the objective and the resource constraint gives the representation of the problem in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is given in two parts. In part i, we derive the structure
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of the allocation. In part ii) we use this structure to derive the representation of the resource
constraint.
Part i: structure of the allocation
The Lagrangian function for our problem takes the form
Li (s) =
s∑
j=1
pj (i) · U
(
j + vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik
)
+
m∑
j=s+1
pj (i) · U (j)
+λi (s) ·
 s∑
j=1
pj (i) ·
(
hij · (i− j)−
(
vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik
))
+ S

+α
(
vi1 −
s−1∑
k=1
hik
)
− β
(
vi1 −
s∑
k=1
hik
)
.
To ease notation in this proof, we define the marginal utility of type (i, j) as
uij ≡ U ′
(
j + vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik
)
.
We begin by stating the derivatives of the objective function with respect to the relevant choice
variables. The derivative with respect to hiz for z < s is equal to
∂Li (s)
∂hiz
= −
s∑
j=z+1
pj (i) · uij + λi (s) ·
pz (i) · (i− z) + s∑
j=z+1
pj (i)
− α+ β. (26)
The derivative with respect to his is equal to
∂Li (s)
∂his
= λi (s) · ps (i) · (i− s) + β. (27)
The derivative with respect to vi1 is equal to
∂L1 (s)
∂vi1
=
s∑
j=1
pj (i) · uij − λi (s) ·
s∑
j=1
pj (i) + α− β. (28)
We analyze the case where S < Pm−1(m − i), because -as we show in sections 3.3 an 3.4 - the
case S >Pm−1(m− i) cannot be part of an overall optimum. At the optimum, for S > 0 we must
have i − s < 0. This implies by (27) that β > 0. To see this, suppose that β = 0. Then, by (27) ,
we would have h∗is = 0. But then, type (i, s+ 1) is not excluded, so the allocation is not incentive
compatible. Next, notice that α = 0 at the optimum. If both β and α were strictly positive, then
- since both constraints must hold with equality - we would have again that h∗is = 0, which means
that effectively type (i, s− 1) is the marginal type. Finally, at any optimum both his and vi1 must
be at stationary points, so ∂Li(s)∂his = 0 and
∂L1(s)
∂vi1
= 0. From (28) we have the first-order condition
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for vi1
s∑
j=1
pj (i) · uij − λi (s) ·
s∑
j=1
pj (i) = β. (29)
Substituting (29) into the condition (27), we obtain
∂Li (s)
∂his
=
s∑
j=1
pj (i) · uij + λi (s) ·
ps (i) · (i− s)− s∑
j=1
pj (i)
 . (30)
Substituting (29) into (26) , we obtain
∂Li (s)
∂hiz
= −
s∑
j=z+1
pj (i) · uij + λi (s) ·
pz (i) · (i− z) + s∑
j=z+1
pj (i)

+
s∑
j=1
pj (i) · uij − λi (s) ·
s∑
j=1
pj (i)
=
z∑
j=1
pj (i) · uij + λi (s) ·
pz (i) · (i− z)− z∑
j=1
pj (i)
 . (31)
Dividing by Pz (i) , we can write both (30) and (31) as
∂Li(s)
∂hiz
Pz (1)
=
z∑
j=1
pj (i)
Pz (i)
· uij + λi (s) ·
(
pz (i)
Pz (i)
· (i− z)− 1
)
(32)
for z ≤ s. From our derivation above, the right-hand side of (32) is equal to zero at z = s, so
s∑
j=1
pj (i)
Ps (i)
· uij + λi (s) ·
(
ps (i)
Ps (i)
· (i− s)− 1
)
= 0. (33)
To prove our proposition, it suffices to show that (33) , in conjunction with Assumption 1 implies
that
z∑
j=1
pj (i)
Pz (i)
· uij + λi (s) ·
(
pz (i)
Pz (i)
· (i− z)− 1
)
> 0
for all z < s. Letting E [uij | j ≤ z] ≡
z∑
j=1
pj(i)
Pz(i)
· uij this inequality can be written as
E [uij | j ≤ z] > λi (s) ·
(
1− pz (i)
Pz (i)
(i− z)
)
for all z < s. We note that type (i, z) receives a weakly higher total income than type (i, z − 1) ,
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since
z + vi1 −
z−1∑
k=1
hik −
(
z − 1 + vi1 −
z−2∑
k=1
hik
)
= 1− hiz−1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, E [uij | j ≤ z] is non-increasing in z. Hence, E [uij | j ≤ z] ≥ E [uij | j ≤ s] for all z < s.
To complete the argument, it suffices to show that
(
1− pz(i)Pz(i) · (i− z)
)
<
(
1− ps(i)Ps(i) · (i− s)
)
for
all z < s. This is equivalent to
pz (i)
Pz (i)
· (z − i) < ps (i)
Ps (i)
· (s− i) . (34)
It is easy to see that this condition is verified for all z such that z ≤ i. We now prove that, under
Assumption 1, the condition is also verified for any z such that i < z < s.
In particular, we show that Assumption 1 implies that for all z ≤ s
pz−1 (i)
Pz−1 (i)
· (z − 1− i) < pz (i)
Pz (i)
· (z − i)
which in turn implies (34) . To see this, it proves convenient to normalize this monotonicity condition
around i. Let a ≡ z − i. With that definition, the condition is equivalent to
(a− 1) · pi+a−1 (i)
Pi+a−1 (i)
< a · pi+a (i)
Pi+a (i)
.
This condition is trivially satisfied for a = 1. So consider the case where a > 1. Manipulating this
condition the same way as we did in the case of taxation, we have the equivalent condition that
Pi+a (i)
pi+a (i)
> a ·
(
Pi+a (i)
pi+a (i)
− Pi+a−1 (i)
pi+a−1 (i)
)
. (35)
Finally, notice that Assumption 1 implies condition (35) . To see this, observe simply that Assump-
tion 1 implies that
Pz+a (i)
pz+a (i)
≥ Pz (i)
pz (i)
+ a ·
(
Pz+a (i)
pz+a (i)
− Pz+a−1 (i)
pz+a−1 (i)
)
(36)
for any z and any a ≥ 0. Since Pz(i)pz(i) > 0, (36) implies (35) .
Part ii: Derivation of the Resource Constraint
With a binding exclusion constraint we have vi1 −
s∑
k=1
hik = 0. Therefore, the excess income of
all types who receive subsidies are given by
vij = vi1 −
j−1∑
k=1
hik =
s∑
k=1
hik −
j−1∑
k=1
hik =
s∑
k=j
hik.
We can calculate the individual subsidies, Sij = −Tij , using the relation
vij = hij · (i− j) + Sij
34
Hence,
Sij =
s∑
k=j
hik − hij · (i− j)
Using the structure of the allocation, we get
Sij =

s− i+ hs for j < s
hs (s+ 1− i) for j = s
0 for j > s
Summing these individual subsidies up we obtain
Ps−1 (i) · (s− i+ hs) + ps (i) · hs · (s+ 1− i) = S. (37)
The marginal type is chosen optimally if s is as large as possible. If s can still be increased, this
means that we can find a Pareto improvement as follows. By raising s, fewer types are excluded.
All types that are included receive the same level of income. Hence, by raising s we raise all the
incomes of all types that are included. The incomes of those who are and remain excluded are
unchanged.
Generalizing the procedure described in the text, one can check that for x ∈ N+ ∪ 0 and for
S ∈ (xPi+(x−1) (i) , (x+ 1)Pi+x (i)] the marginal type is
s = i+ x
and hs is determined by the condition
hs =
S − xPi+x−1 (i)
xpi+x (i) + Pi+x (i)
.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose the contrapositive were true and there were a produc-
tivity group i′′ that is subsidized and a productivity group i′ that is taxed, where i′′ > i′. Based on
this assumption, we will construct a budget balanced, incentive compatible redistribution scheme
between these two groups. It follows that the initial allocation was not optimal.
The idea of the redistribution scheme is as follows. Given i′≥ 1, there is in each productivity
group a set of individuals with low opportunity costs of time who will work full time at the optimal
allocation. In groups that are taxed, the right-wards incentive constraints are tight. It follows that
the marginal type, who works part time, has a strict preference for his own allocation relative to
mimicking his left-ward neighbor who works full time. To ease notation in this proof, we shall write
t (i′) for t (i′, Ti′) and s (i′′) for s (i′′, Ti′′) .
To see these arguments formally, recall that the optimal allocation satisfies
V
(
i′, t
(
i′
)− 1, t (i′)− 1) = V (i′, t (i′) , t (i′)− 1) = V (i′, t (i′) , t (i′))+ ht(i′).
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Hence, we can write
V
(
i′, t
(
i′
)
, t
(
i′
))
= V
(
i′, t
(
i′
)− 1, t (i′)− 1)− ht(i′).
If the marginal type mimics his left-wards neighbor, he obtains excess income
V
(
i′, t
(
i′
)− 1, t (i′)) = V (i′, t (i′)− 1, t (i′)− 1)− 1.
But then it follows that
V
(
i′, t
(
i′
)− 1, t (i′)) = V (i′, t (i′)− 1, t (i′)− 1)− 1
< V
(
i′, t
(
i′
)− 1, t (i′)− 1)− ht(i′) = V (i′, t (i′) , t (i′)) .
Hence, we can decrease the taxes paid by all individuals who work full time by an identical amount,
say εi′ , without violating incentive compatibility.
In the group that is subsidized, we can decrease the subsidies paid to all individuals who work
full time by an amount εi′′ without affecting incentive compatibility and the exclusion constraint.
To see this, recall that we have imposed the left-wards constraint for the marginal type so that
V
(
i′′, s
(
i′′
)
, s
(
i′′
))
= V
(
i′′, s
(
i′′
)− 1, s (i′′)) = V (i′′, s (i′′)− 1, s (i′′)− 1)− 1
Hence,
V
(
i′′, s
(
i′′
)− 1, s (i′′)− 1) = V (i′′, s (i′′) , s (i′′))+ 1.
If type (i′′, s (i′′)− 1) mimics his right-wards neighbor, then he would obtain an excess income of
V
(
i′′, s
(
i′′
)
, s
(
i′′
)− 1) = V (i′′, s (i′′) , s (i′′))+ hs(i′′).
Hence, it follows that
V
(
i′′, s
(
i′′
)− 1, s (i′′)− 1) = V (i′′, s (i′′) , s (i′′))+1 > V (i′′, s (i′′) , s (i′′))+hs(i′′) = V (i′′, s (i′′) , s (i′′)− 1) .
Choose εi′′ and εi′ such that
pi′′ · Ps(i′′)−1
(
i′′
) · εi′′ + pi′ · Pt(i′)−1 (i′) · εi′ = 0.
By construction, the new allocation and the initial allocation generate the same expected level
of income for all groups together. However, the distributions differ by a mean preserving spread.
Hence, the new allocation is preferred.
The following definition and Lemma are used in the proof of Proposition 5.
Definition The parameters i and j are affiliated if for any j > j′ and any integer b > 0
pij′
pij
− pi+b,j′
pi+b,j
≥ 0. (38)
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The parameters −i and j are affiliated if for any j > j′ and any integer b > 0
pij′
pij
− pi+b,j′
pi+b,j
≤ 0. (39)
We say that the degree of affiliation is non-decreasing in i if for any j > j′ and any integer b > 0
pij′
pij
− pi+b,j′
pi+b,j
≥ pi′j′
pi′j
− pi′+b,j′
pi′+b,j
for any i > i′. (40)
Lemma 3 If the degree of affiliation is non-decreasing in i then for any j Pj(i)pj(i) ≥ 12
Pj(i−1)
pj(i−1) +
1
2
Pj(i+1)
pj(i+1)
for all 1 < i < n.
Proof of Lemma 3. With b = 1 and i′ = i− 1 we have from (40)
pij′
pij
− pi+1,j′
pi+1,j
≥ pi−1,j′
pi−1,j
− pi,j′
pi,j
.
Multiplying the first ratio by pipi , the second by
pi+1
pi+1
, and so on, we can write
pi
pi
· pij′
pij
− pi+1
pi+1
· pi+1,j′
pi+1,j
≥ pi−1
pi−1
· pi−1,j′
pi−1,j
− pi
pi
· pij′
pij
.
Substituting for
pij′
pi
= pj′ (i) , and for analogous terms in the remaining ratios, we have
pj′ (i)
pj (i)
− pj′ (i+ 1)
pj (i+ 1)
≥ pj′ (i− 1)
pj (i− 1) −
pj′ (i)
pj (i)
.
Summing for j′ = 1, ..., j − 1, we can write
j−1∑
j′=1
pj′ (i)
pj (i)
−
j−1∑
j′=1
pj′ (i+ 1)
pj (i+ 1)
≥
j−1∑
j′=1
pj′ (i− 1)
pj (i− 1) −
j−1∑
j′=1
pj′ (i)
pj (i)
.
Performing this summation, we have
Pj−1 (i)
pj (i)
− Pj−1 (i+ 1)
pj (i+ 1)
≥ Pj−1 (i− 1)
pj (i− 1) −
Pj−1 (i)
pj (i)
.
Adding pj(i)pj(i) −
pj(i+1)
pj(i+1)
= 0 on the left-hand side and pj(i−1)pj(i−1) −
pj(i)
pj(i)
= 0 on the right-hand side, we
obtain
Pj (i)
pj (i)
− Pj (i+ 1)
pj (i+ 1)
≥ Pj (i− 1)
pj (i− 1) −
Pj (i)
pj (i)
.
Rearranging this condition, we have
Pj (i)
pj (i)
≥ 1
2
Pj (i− 1)
pj (i− 1) +
1
2
Pj (i+ 1)
pj (i+ 1)
.
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Proof of Proposition 5. The proof proceeds by direct comparison of the marginal utilities
expressions in three cases that cover all the possibilities. First, we compare the marginal utilities
across groups that are taxed, second across the group with the lowest market productivity that is
still taxed and the group with the highest market productivity that already receives a subsidy, and
third across groups that are subsidized. In each case we conclude that the marginal utilities are
monotonic in i, and that the identity of the marginal type is monotonic in i.
Case 1: two groups that are taxed. Consider two groups with market productivity i and i− 1,
where i > i. Suppose the equation
U ′ (z − 1 + h) = λ ·
(
1− pz (i− 1)
Pz−1 (i− 1) · (i− 1− z)
)
has a solution at z = t (i− 1) for some h = ht(i−1) ∈ [0, 1] , so
U ′
(
t (i− 1)− 1 + ht(i−1)
)
= λ ·
(
1− pt(i−1) (i− 1)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
· (i− 1− t (i− 1))
)
.
Consider now the derivative of the payoff function with respect to hit(i−1). Fix the allocation for
the group with market productivity i at the optimal allocation for group i−1, that is at hij = 1 for
j < t (i− 1) and hit(i−1) = ht(i−1), and consider the derivative of the payoff with respect to hit(i−1),
evaluated at this allocation. At this allocation, all individuals with opportunity costs less than or
equal to t (i− 1) receive the same total income; so the derivative of the payoff function is equal to
U ′
(
t (i− 1)− 1 + ht(i−1)
)− λ · (1− pt(i−1) (i)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
· (i− ht(i−1))) .
This expression is strictly positive if and only if
λ ·
(
1− pt(i−1) (i)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
· (i− t (i− 1))
)
< λ ·
(
1− pt(i−1) (i− 1)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
· (i− 1− t (i− 1))
)
.
In turn, this condition is equivalent to
pt(i−1) (i)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
· (i− t (i− 1)) > pt(i−1) (i− 1)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
· (i− 1− t (i− 1)) .
Rearranging this expression we have
Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
pt(i−1) (i− 1)
· (i− t (i− 1)) > Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
pt(i−1) (i)
· (i− 1− t (i− 1)) .
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We can reformulate this expression to
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
pt(i−1) (i)
>
(
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
pt(i−1) (i)
− Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
pt(i−1) (i− 1)
)
· (i− t (i− 1)) . (41)
Since i − t (i− 1) > i − 1 − t (i− 1) ≥ 0 (41) is always satisfied if Pt(i−1)−1(i)pt(i−1)(i) −
Pt(i−1)−1(i−1)
pt(i−1)(i−1) ≤
0. So, suppose that Pt(i−1)−1(i)pt(i−1)(i) −
Pt(i−1)−1(i−1)
pt(i−1)(i−1) > 0. Note that Assumption 2 implies then that
Pt(i−1)−1(i′)
pt(i−1)(i′)
− Pt(i−1)−1(i′−1)pt(i−1)(i′−1) > 0 for all i
′ < i. Moreover, we can bound the expression on the right-
hand side, noting that
i− t (i− 1) ≤ i− 1.
So, it is true that
Pt(i−1)−1 (1)
pt(i−1) (1)
+
(
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
pt(i−1) (i)
− Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
pt(i−1) (i− 1)
)
·(i− 1) >
(
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
pt(i−1) (i)
− Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
pt(i−1) (i− 1)
)
·(i− t (i− 1)) .
Thus, a sufficient condition for (41) is
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
pt(i−1) (i)
≥ Pt(i−1)−1 (1)
pt(i−1) (1)
+
(
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
pt(i−1) (i)
− Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
pt(i−1) (i− 1)
)
· (i− 1) ,
which is implied by Assumption 2.
So, we have shown that
U ′
(
t (i− 1)− 1 + ht(i−1)
)− λ · (1− pt(i−1) (i)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i)
· (i− t (i− 1))
)
> U ′
(
t (i− 1)− 1 + ht(i−1)
)− λ · (1− pt(i−1) (i− 1)
Pt(i−1)−1 (i− 1)
· (i− 1− t (i− 1))
)
= 0.
It follows that
t (i) + ht(i) > t (i− 1) + ht(i−1). (42)
Therefore, the after-tax incomes of the inframarginal types in group i are strictly higher at the
optimum than the incomes of the inframarginal types in group i− 1. (42) implies directly that
t (i) ≥ t (i− 1) . (43)
To see this, suppose that we had t (i) < t (i− 1) , contrary to what we just claimed. Substracting
t (i) on both sides of inequality (42), we have
ht(i) > t (i− 1)− t (i) + ht(i−1).
But if t (i) < t (i− 1) then t (i− 1) − t (i) ≥ 1, so t (i− 1) − t (i) + ht(i−1) ≥ 1 + ht(i−1). However,
that can only hold if
ht(i) > 1 + ht(i−1).
However, this contradicts the fact that both ht(i) and ht(i−1) belong to the unit interval. Hence, we
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have shown that t (i) ≥ t (i− 1) .
Case 2: i = i, two groups where one with market productivity i is taxed and the other with
market productivity i− 1 is subsidized.
For the group that is taxed, the marginal utility of the marginal type satisfies
U ′
(
t (i)− 1 + ht(i)
)
= λ ·
(
1− pt(i) (i)
Pt(i)−1 (i)
· (i− t (i))
)
.
For the group that is subsidized, the marginal utility of the marginal type satisfies
U ′
(
s (i− 1) + hs(i−1)
)
= λ ·
(
1− ps(i−1) (i− 1)
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
· (i− 1− s (i− 1))
)
.
These solutions satisfy U ′
(
t (i)− 1 + ht(i)
) ≤ U ′ (s (i− 1) + hs(i−1)) if and only if
λ ·
(
1− pt(i) (i)
Pt(i)−1 (i)
· (i− t (i))
)
≤ λ ·
(
1− ps(i−1) (i− 1)
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
· (i− 1− s (i− 1))
)
.
It is easy to see that this condition must always hold, since we have i−t (i) ≥ 0 and i−1−s (i− 1) ≤
0. The former property is necessary since group i is taxed; the latter property is optimal since
incomes of individuals in group i − 1 are raised. It follows that the after-tax incomes of the
inframarginal types in group i are strictly higher than the after-tax incomes of all types in group
i− 1 who receive any subsidies. Formally, we have
t (i)− 1 + ht(i) ≥ s (i− 1) + hs(i−1). (44)
This implies further that
t (i)− 1 ≥ s (i− 1) . (45)
To see this, suppose again that the contrary were true, so that t (i)− 1 < s (i− 1) . This, however,
would imply that
ht(i) ≥ s (i− 1)− (t (i)− 1) + hs(i−1) ≥ 1 + hs(i−1),
which cannot be the case, because both ht(i) and hs(i−1) belong to the unit interval and hs(i−1) > 0.
Case 3: i < i, two groups with market productivity i and i− 1 that are both subsidized.
Subsidized individuals in the lower productivity group receive incomes equal to s (i− 1)+hs(i−1);
subsidized individuals in the higher productivity group receive incomes equal to s (i)+hs(i). Suppose
the equation
U ′ (z + h) = λ ·
(
1− pz (i− 1)
Pz (i− 1) · (i− 1− z)
)
has a solution for z = s (i− 1) and some h = hs(i−1) ∈ (0, 1] , so
U ′
(
s (i− 1) + hs(i−1)
)
= λ ·
(
1− ps(i−1) (i− 1)
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
· (i− 1− s (i− 1))
)
.
As for case 1) we evaluate the derivative of the payoff function for the group with market produc-
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tivity i at the optimal allocation for group i− 1, to show that
U ′
(
s (i− 1) + hs(i−1)
)− λ · (1− ps(i−1) (i)
Ps(i−1) (i)
· (i− s (i− 1))
)
> 0.
This statement is true if and only if(
1− ps(i−1) (i)
Ps(i−1) (i)
· (i− s (i− 1))
)
<
(
1− ps(i−1) (i− 1)
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
· (i− 1− s (i− 1))
)
or, equivalently, if and only if(
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
ps(i−1) (i− 1)
− Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
)
· (s (i− 1)− i) < Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
. (46)
Note that s (i− 1) ≥ i − 1. In fact, it is easy to show that (46) is always satisfied if s (i− 1) ≤ i,
so consider the case where s (i− 1) > i. Then, (46) is always satisfied if Ps(i−1)(i−1)ps(i−1)(i−1) −
Ps(i−1)(i)
ps(i−1)(i)
≤ 0,
so suppose that Ps(i−1)(i−1)ps(i−1)(i−1) −
Ps(i−1)(i)
ps(i−1)(i)
> 0. In this case, Assumption 2 implies that Ps(i−1)(i
′−1)
ps(i−1)(i′−1) −
Ps(i−1)(i′)
ps(i−1)(i′)
> 0 for any i′ > i. Moreover, we can derive an upper bound for the expression on the
left-hand side of (46) ; noting that s (i− 1) ≤ m, we have
s (i− 1)− i ≤ m− i,
so we can write(
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
ps(i−1) (i− 1)
− Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
)
·(s (i− 1)− i) ≤
(
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
ps(i−1) (i− 1)
− Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
)
·(m− i)+Ps(i−1) (m)
ps(i−1) (m)
Thus, our condition is satisfied if we have
P
s(i−1) (m)
ps(i−1) (m)
+
(
Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
ps(i−1) (i− 1)
− Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
)
· (m− i) < Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
.
Rearranging appropriately, we have
Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
+
(
Ps(i−1) (i)
ps(i−1) (i)
− Ps(i−1) (i− 1)
ps(i−1) (i− 1)
)
· (m− i) > Ps(i−1) (m)
ps(i−1) (m)
, (47)
which is implied by Assumption 2. Hence we have shown that
s (i) + hs(i) > s (i− 1) + hs(i−1).
Moreover, by the now familiar argument, this implies also that
s (i) ≥ s (i− 1) .
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Proof of Proposition 6. The incentive constraint for an arbitrary allocation rule wij is
that for all (i, j)
hij · (wij − j)− Tij ≥ hıˆˆ · (wıˆˆ − j)− Tıˆˆ ∀ (ˆı, ˆ) s.t.wıˆˆ ≤ i. (48)
Adjust the allocation for all (i, j) as follows: change wij to w˜ij = i, leave the allocation of working
times unchanged, hij = h˜ij , and change the taxes from Tij to T˜ij = Tij+hij ·(i− wij) . Substituting
the adjusted rules,
{
hij , w˜ij , T˜ij
}
for all i, j into (48) , we find that
hij · (i− j)− T˜ij ≥ hıˆˆ · (ˆı− j)− T˜ıˆˆ ∀ (ˆı, ˆ) s.t.wıˆˆ ≤ i. (49)
By construction, the left-hand side of (48) and (49) are equal for all (i, j) and the right-hand sides
of (48) and (49) are equal for all ıˆ, ˆ. The incentive constraint under the new allocation takes the
form
hij · (i− j)− T˜ij ≥ hıˆˆ · (ˆı− j)− T˜ıˆˆ ∀ (ˆı, ˆ) s.t.ˆı ≤ i, (50)
because w˜ij = i. (50) is implied by (49) . The reason is that feasibility of the initial allocation
requires that the rule wij satisfies wij ≤ i for all i, j. Hence, the set {ıˆ, ˆ : ıˆ ≤ i} is a subset of the
set {ıˆ, ˆ : wıˆˆ ≤ i} . So, the new rule is incentive compatible. Finally consider budget balancedness
and individual rationality. Since the initial allocation was budget balanced, the new allocation runs
a surplus, which can be distributed in lumpsum fashion to all individuals. This redistribution does
not affect any participation constraints.
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